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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Greater  automation  of air  trafﬁc  control  (ATC)  could  reduce  aviation’s  climate  change  impacts,  but
improvements  predicted  long  ago  have  been  slow  to happen.  This  resistance  to ATC  modernisation  is
framed  as  an issue  of  lock-in,  and  the  detailed  case  study  described  here  enables  an  analysis  of  the  fac-
tors  involved  in slowing  change.  Although  the classic  lock-in  effects  of  ‘increasing  returns’  and  ‘network
externalities’  are  important,  a major  barrier  to  modernisation  is  due  to the  political  and  organisational
challenges  of coordinating  change  across  a large,  complex  socio-technical  system.  However,  lock-in  effectseywords:
reen aviation
ock-in
ocio-technical systems
are  crucial  with  respect  to  the  perceived  increasing  returns  accrued  from  experience  with  manual  ATC
operations,  and  the  difﬁculty  of  quantifying  the  risks  of automation  (particularly  as  regard  the  use of  com-
plex  software)  is  a major  barrier  to  further  improvements.  Overcoming  this  obstacle  to further  automation
depends  on  ﬁnding  ways  to test  and  operate  new  ATC  software  and  procedures  without  compromising
safety.
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. Introduction
In early 2010 the Obama Administration set out a new vision for
ASA, with, amongst other changes, a refocusing towards ‘green
viation’, and a budget request that allocated $20 million per year
to support NASA’s environmentally responsible aviation program’
51]. The green aviation label encompassed many activities, includ-
ng work on aerodynamics, engine technology and biofuels, as well
s on air trafﬁc control (ATC).
Although ATC improvements only offer modest environmental
eneﬁts, they have the advantage that they could be implemented
ithout the need to replace current aircraft. Such ATC-driven
eductions in aviation’s climate change impact could thus in princi-
le be implemented relatively quickly. The two main alternative
pproaches will take decades to have signiﬁcant impacts. Avia-
ion biofuel could be developed to make air travel sustainable, but
he sheer amount required, along with the problematic nature of
ost current sources, make a rapid transition unlikely. Likewise,
lthough greener aircraft with markedly better fuel-efﬁciency are
easible [33], their commercial viability is less certain [50]. More-
ver, even if radically greener airliners can be built that are socially
cceptable, it would be many years before the current aircraft
∗ Tel.: +44 0131 650 6394.
E-mail address: g.spinardi@ed.ac.uk
u
A
i
i
i
u
t
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2014.11.006
214-6296/© 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article unhed  by Elsevier  Ltd.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY  license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
nventory is completely replaced, whereas improvements in ATC
fﬁciency would provide environmental beneﬁts with both current
nd future aircraft.
Advances in ATC technology have long been predicted. A 1981
AND report [70, p. 2] noted that:
The prospect of almost total automation is no longer only sci-
ence ﬁction. Computers are powerful and fast enough to project
aircraft ﬂight paths far into the future, to automatically cor-
rect them when they conﬂict with the anticipated ﬂight proﬁles
of nearby aircraft, and to digitally transmit the revised clear-
ances up to the aircraft. Machines can continuously compute
and update delay predictions, so that aircraft can be slowed at
fuel-efﬁcient higher altitudes when airports are operating at
peak capacities.
However, over three decades later such levels of automation are
till not implemented. Drawing on interviews with key personnel
t NASA, and on analysis of NASA documentation, as well as of the
rade and secondary literature, this paper describes the ﬁrst major
se of automation in the US ATC system, the Trafﬁc Management
dvisor (TMA) developed by the NASA Ames Research Center. Set
n the context of broader US ATC developments, this case study
s used to address three questions. What are the obstacles to the
mplementation of more automated ATC? Can these obstacles be
nderstood in terms of ‘lock-in’ of the existing socio-technical sys-
em? And what measures could be used to overcome such lock-in?
der the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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. Aviation, climate change, and air trafﬁc control
Aviation contributes to climate change by increasing levels of
reenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide, ozone and water vapour,
nd by stimulating the creation of cirrus cloud around ‘contrails’
condensation trails) that reﬂect more energy back to the earth
han they reﬂect away from the earth. Total ‘radiative forcing’ –
imply put, atmospheric warming – due to aviation is thought to
e about three times that due to aircraft carbon dioxide emissions
lone [60, p. 18]. Using biofuels (assuming that these can be sourced
n a way that is both environmentally and economically desirable)
ould thus only be a partial solution.
More efﬁcient ATC offers a ‘win-win’ outcome, with both envi-
onmental and economic beneﬁts. For example, a 2000 report on
viation and the environment by the US Government Accounting
fﬁce (GAO) noted that:
Operational improvements in such areas as communications,
navigation, surveillance, and air trafﬁc management could also
lead to reductions in aircraft emissions. . . . improvements in air
trafﬁc management worldwide could reduce the annual con-
sumption of aircraft fuel by 6 to 12 percent over the next 20
years [26, p. 22].
The potential environmental beneﬁts lie in two  areas. First, bet-
er ATC could make air travel more fuel-efﬁcient. The ideal ﬂight
ath for an aircraft would be for it to be able to operate as if there
ere no other aircraft around, and so no potential conﬂicts that
ould force it to take a sub-optimum ﬂight path. An optimum ﬂight
ath, in terms of fuel efﬁciency, would not only take the shortest
oute, and involve no ‘stacking’ while waiting for a landing slot,
ut it would also ﬂy at the optimum (high) altitude for most of the
ourney, with a continuous ‘cruise climb’ after take-off, and land
ollowing a continuous ‘idle thrust’ descent. In particular, enabling
ircraft to utilise idle thrust descents, with low engine power, is a
ey challenge for ATC because of the complexity and time pressure
f many different types of aircraft converging on a limited landing
pace at an airport. ATC automation enables trajectories to be pre-
icted, and adjustments made, further from the airport so that the
nal descent can be smooth and energy efﬁcient.
Second, greater ATC automation could enable aircraft to avoid
reas most likely to produce contrails, thus minimising the radia-
ive forcing resulting from cloud formation, although there would
e trade-offs involved in not ﬂying the most direct routes [64].
viation-induced cirrus cloud formation has a potentially large
mpact on radiative forcing that cannot be ameliorated by the use of
iofuels or improved aircraft efﬁciency [72, p. 743]. Sophisticated
TC might also enable aircraft to ﬂy below contrail-prone altitudes
lthough again there would be a trade-off with fuel-efﬁciency, and
aybe objections on grounds of comfort and safety.
. The challenge of lock-in
There are many obstacles to the fundamental transitions in
nergy production and use that are required to limit climate
hange. Technological innovation is necessary, but it is not suf-
cient to bring about these transitions. As Sovacool ([63], p. 1;
ee also [62]) notes, much research on energy has had too nar-
ow a focus on technology and economics, while downplaying ‘the
uman dimensions of energy use and environmental change.’ At
he level of economics it is clear that market forces alone will not
ring about transitions quickly enough, and that economic instru-
ents such as carbon taxes or emissions trading are often poorly
ocussed [23] and hard to implement without unintended conse-
uences [39]. At the individual level, exhortations to adopt greener
o
p
[
dcial Science 6 (2015) 41–49
ifestyles have limited success, are inappropriate for much of the
orld’s population that live in poverty [3], and ﬂounder due to iner-
ia even when the ﬁnancial payback is clear [65] or because of the
ack of social acceptance of novel solutions.
With regard to US ATC technology the key question is why  it has
ot made the transition to the greater levels of automation that
ould enable greener air travel. It is thus appropriate to address
his question through the conceptual lens of lock-in theory. The
dea that the adoption of more environmentally desirable technolo-
ies is prevented by lock-in builds on work by Arthur, David and
thers on ‘path dependency’. Arthur [2, p. 116] argues that tech-
ologies get locked in because ‘the more they are adopted, the more
xperience is gained with them, and the more they are improved’,
nd thus ‘a technology that by chance gains an early lead in adop-
ion may  eventually “corner the market” of potential adopters, with
he other technologies becoming locked out.’
Alongside this ‘increasing returns’ effect, a second concept
nderpinning the idea of lock-in hinges on the role of ‘network
xternalities’. Although he did not use this term in his 1985 paper,
his idea is central to David’s iconic, though contested (see [46]),
WERTY keyboard example. David [10, p. 334] argues that the
istory of QWERTY shows that what many consider an inferior
echnology remains locked in because of ‘technical interrelated-
ess, economies of scale, and quasi-irreversibility of investment’ (his
talics). In other words, there was a strong linkage between the
ypewriter keyboard design and the expertise to type on it quickly.
hus, the more that one keyboard design dominated, the more it
aid to be skilful in its use, and once such a large stock of keyboards
nd of people skilled in their use existed, it became increasingly
ard for a competitor to gain traction.
Increasing returns and network externalities provide mecha-
isms for understanding how an inferior technology might persist
n the face of superior alternatives. Previous studies of techno-
ogical lock-in have focussed both on particular artefacts – e.g.,
he light water nuclear reactor [7] and the gasoline car [8] – and
n large technological systems [66]. Lock-in has been highlighted
s a particular concern for infrastructure-dependent vehicle tech-
ologies because of ‘high infrastructure investment costs and the
resence of network externalities’ [67, p. 98]. With automobiles or
ther vehicles, lock-in can be conceptualised as hinging on con-
umer or operator choice, and potential policy options include
hether to support more R&D on new vehicle technologies or to
upport infrastructure development [67]. However, such an anal-
sis focuses on the way that the infrastructure inhibits transitions
n vehicles, but ignores the possibility that infrastructure improve-
ents may  themselves be inhibited by lock-in.
Unlike with vehicles, ATC technology cannot be understood as
 single technical artefact, amenable to technological substitution
ased on consumer or operator choice; rather, it is part of the
nfrastructure that makes air travel possible. ATC is a large tech-
ological system with capabilities stemming from the interactions
f many elements, including radars, communications systems, soft-
are, and human operators. Thus, there are not only lock-in issues
o consider, but also the challenges of implementing change in
arge socio-technical systems [38] involving complex products and
ystems [36], often requiring large investments from both pub-
ic and private sources [32]. The nature of the technology and its
rganisational and political context are thus likely to make rad-
cal innovation difﬁcult, as is the emphasis in aviation on ‘high
eliability’ [43] and risk minimisation [15]. These factors present
hallenges to the explanatory utility of an approach based solely
n economics-derived lock-in theory. Accordingly an interdisci-
linary approach is adopted here, because, as noted by Sovacool
63, p. 26], ‘the energy problems facing society cut across academic
isciplines.’
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As a result most of the AAS programme was  cancelled in 1994
[55, p. 24]. According to the FAA’s Steven Zaidman: ‘We  shot
for the moon. We tried to do advanced technology, computerG. Spinardi / Energy Research
Although components have been modernised over the years, the
asic way that ATC operates has remained largely the same, with
nly limited automation. Automation matters because the tradi-
ional approach to ATC involving air trafﬁc controllers manually
uiding aircraft through airspace sectors cannot provide sufﬁ-
iently ﬁne control to enable the most fuel-efﬁcient operation. The
ext section describes how traditional ATC developed, with most
fforts at automation stymied, and this is followed in Section 5
y an account of the development and implementation of NASA’s
MA  technology that enables aircraft arrivals to be more efﬁciently
anaged.
Section 6 then describes the potential for more fully automated
TC, and the obstacles to its implementation. In Section 7 the case
tudy is analysed in terms of the economic lock-in concepts of
ncreasing returns and network externalities. Other reasons for the
ack of progress are discussed, and some policy implications set out
n Section 8.
. The development of US air trafﬁc control
Reducing aviation’s environmental impacts has not historically
een central to ATC developments: the main driver of change has
een maintaining safety while increasing capacity. Because any col-
ision could cause considerable (and highly visible) loss of life, it has
ong been seen as crucial to maintain sufﬁcient separation between
ircraft. The ﬁrst moves towards a US system began in the 1920s
s increasing numbers of ﬂights raised concerns about congestion
nd safety. However, the modern system of air trafﬁc management
nly took shape in the 1950s when civilian radar systems were
nstalled (for the early history, see [42]). These ground-based radars
ould track aircraft, thus enabling air trafﬁc controllers to plot their
ovements and provide guidance by radio links to help keep suf-
cient spacing between aircraft. A further development came in
he 1960s with the implementation of secondary radar in which a
mall radar transponder carried by aircraft provides information as
o its identity.
In this traditional ATC, aircraft are passed from sector to sec-
or, and guided through sectors under voice control by air trafﬁc
ontrollers using radar information displayed on screens. Between
irports aircraft move along predeﬁned air routes (known as ‘victor
irways’ below 18,000 feet and ‘jetways’ above that). Having these
outes meant that radars did not need to cover the whole of the
S, and they also facilitate trafﬁc management by air trafﬁc con-
rollers. Current rules applicable to commercial ﬂights specify that
n most cases aircraft must be kept at least 5 nautical miles apart
orizontally and 1000 feet vertically.
These ATC procedures enabled growth in air trafﬁc whilst main-
aining safety (for exceptions, see [71], pp. 25–30). However, they
o not provide the most fuel-efﬁcient air travel, and have struggled
o cope with congestion at busy airports. Many aircraft converging
n an airport with limited landing capacity poses a particular chal-
enge, and there is a clear trade-off between fuel efﬁciency and risks
o safety. Maintaining safe separation with high levels of trafﬁc can
ean asking pilots to slow down or put their aircraft into holding
atterns, but ‘holding trafﬁc at low altitudes is not fuel efﬁcient’
73, p. 2].
Three developments spurred ATC improvement after declining
nvestment during the 1970s [6, p. 4]. First, there was  the 1973
oil crisis’ that resulted from an embargo by Arab oil producers in
rotest at the US providing assistance to Israel in the Yom Kippur
ar. Greatly increased oil prices raised the cost of aviation fuel,
nd led to a concern about fuel efﬁciency. Second, the 1978 Airline
eregulation Act not only increased passenger numbers, but also
llowed airlines to move to ‘hub and spoke’ operations producingcial Science 6 (2015) 41–49 43
ncreased trafﬁc at hub airports [59, p. 50]. Finally, in 1981 there
as a national air trafﬁc controllers’ strike in the USA. Although
nsuccessful (indeed catastrophic for the union and strikers), the
trike raised awareness of the stressful nature of the job and the
geing nature of much of the equipment [49,52].
As a consequence the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
stablished a ‘multibillion-dollar modernisation effort’ [25, p. 2] in
ts 1983 National Airspace System (NAS) Plan. Amongst the claimed
eneﬁts of the plan was that: ‘By permitting ﬂight paths to be less
ircuitous, automating air route trafﬁc control centres would save
uel’ [6, p. 16]. Assuming that Congress provided funding, the NAS
lan was expected to be completed by the mid-1990s, and would
nvolve ‘the highest practical level of air trafﬁc control automation’
58, p. 10].
Central to this modernisation plan was the Advanced Automa-
ion System (AAS) which was ‘expected to include the new
utomated capabilities needed to cope with predicted increases
n air trafﬁc and to provide operational beneﬁts to users, such as
ore fuel-efﬁcient routes’ [24, p. 1]. Much of this effort comprised
 range of technologies geared towards improving data processing,
ommunications, displays, and radar systems and other devices for
etermining the location and speed of aircraft. It was thus intended
o modernise the existing approach: ‘Each of the devices or systems
entioned above improves one aspect of the nation’s ATC system,
ut ATC authority remains ﬁrmly in the eyes, ears, and minds of
uman beings poised over radar scopes’ [70, p. 8].
However, the FAA also had a plan for more radical change in
S ATC, one that would introduce full automation. A 1981 report
repared for the FAA set out this concept:
Suppose we  could virtually replace these fallible human beings
with a set of computer modules which could manipulate aircraft
tracks so well that human intervention with individual aircraft
would be necessary only in response to a major perturbation
(eg, a massive computer failure, or extensive storm-front pas-
sage). Suppose this computer system were able to automatically
compute conﬂict-free clearances for aircraft under surveillance,
to automatically transmit these clearances in a timely fashion,
and to automatically monitor for compliance, taking corrective
action as required [70, p. 8].
This fundamental ambition was at the heart of the FAA’s Auto-
ated En-Route Air Trafﬁc Control (AERA) programme, described
s ‘the most elaborate part of the FAA’s $32 billion plan to automate
ir trafﬁc control’ [41, p. 77]. Developed by the Mitre Corporation,
he AERA software was  designed to compute aircraft trajectories
ased on radar data and local wind speed predictions, and thus
roject aircraft ﬂight paths up to twenty minutes into the future
41, pp. 81 & 86]. Impending conﬂicts would be detected, and alter-
tions made if necessary, according to certain priorities (such as
hether an aircraft had already started to descend for landing, in
hich case it could receive priority to stay on its original course).
However, this attempt at ATC automation was largely unsuc-
essful – ‘sunk by unrealistic speciﬁcations and human factors
ifﬁculties, among other problems’ [55, p. 20]. In particular, ‘the
ERA programme was  never able to develop software that could
o what was  promised. Vastly exaggerated claims fell ﬂat because
he underlying science and mathematical algorithm simply did not
xist at that time.’11 Email from Heinz Erzberger, November 30, 2011.
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Erzberger persuasive. The ﬁrst live data became available to Ames
in 1989, with the full complement of data available by 1992.8
Others were also persuaded. According to Erzberger ‘we built
2 Interview with Heinz Erzberger, November 11, 2010 and email, November 30,
2011.
3 Interview with Dr. Heinz Erzberger by Robert G. Ferguson, 27 February 2008.
My  thanks to Heinz Erzberger for supplying me with this transcript.4 G. Spinardi / Energy Research
eplacements, new procedures, new software, and new decision
upport services all at once. We  didn’t realise the full scope of
uman factors. We  put too much risk in the programme in terms
f pushing technology too fast. We  underestimated the magnitude
f the change’ (in [55], pp. 24 & 25).
However, similar concepts resurfaced in January 1995 when the
eport of the RTCA Board of Director’s Select Committee on Free
light was published. Formerly known at the Radio Technical Com-
ission for Aeronautics, RTCA is a non-proﬁt organisation involved
n developing standards for the aviation industry. Its 1995 report
eﬁned free ﬂight as a ‘safe and efﬁcient ﬂight . . . in which [pilots]
ave the freedom to select their path and speed in real time. Air traf-
c restrictions are only imposed to ensure separation, to preclude
xceeding airport capacity, to prevent unauthorised ﬂight through
pecial use airspace (for example, airspace restricted for military
perations), and (otherwise) to ensure safety in ﬂight’ (in [55], p.
3).
A key capability planned for Free Flight was a ‘conﬂict probe’
ased on the User Request Evaluation Tool (URET) that had been
eveloped in AERA, and this was deployed at Indianapolis and
emphis in the late 1990s. This conﬂict probe ‘processes real-
ime ﬂight plan and track data’ which are ‘combined with site
daptation, aircraft performance characteristics, and winds and
emperatures from the National Weather Service in order to build
our-dimensional ﬂight proﬁles, or trajectories’ [5, p. xii].
URET thus helps air trafﬁc controllers avoid conﬂicts, enabling ‘a
reater number of user-preferred ﬂight paths, and allows increased
ystem capacity while maintaining the current level of safety’ [40,
. 5]. Amongst the beneﬁts of this is that aircraft can remain at their
referred altitudes for longer, resulting in reduced fuel burn. A 2001
eport noted that even the limited deployment of URET provided
uel savings that were ‘saving airlines approximately $950,000
nnually’ ([40], p. 6; see, also [53]).
Nevertheless, the FAA’s major effort to modernise ATC up to
he 1990s produced limited beneﬁts, with the widespread percep-
ion that ‘success has been minimal’ [55, p. 19]. In particular, these
fforts did not address one of the main challenges in ATC: the con-
ergence of aircraft as they seek to land at a busy airport. Airport
onvergence is the key bottleneck for ATC, with the airline indus-
ry’s hub and spoke approach leading to severe over-crowding at
ertain airports. This meant delays, fuel-inefﬁcient aircraft opera-
ion, and high levels of stress for air trafﬁc controllers.
. NASA and the algorithmic approach to ATC
This convergence problem was addressed by Heinz Erzberger
nd his colleagues at NASA Ames in California. Whereas others –
uch as in the FAA’s overly ambitious AERA – had conceptualised
ully automated ATC ‘capable of ﬂying an aircraft automatically
rom takeoff to landing’, Erzberger sought to tackle a more nar-
owly deﬁned, but crucial part of the problem: ‘the problem of
utomating a segment of the ﬂight during which pilot workload
s particularly heavy . . . within the terminal area, roughly within a
0-mile radius of an airport’ [16, p. 2]. Initially, the primary concern
f this work was with the heavy workload of both the pilot and air
rafﬁc controllers.
However, fuel efﬁciency became an important factor with the
973 ‘oil crisis’. From 1973 to 1987 NASA as a whole focussed much
f its aviation work on this issue in its Aircraft Energy Efﬁciency
rogramme [4]. Erzberger sought to contribute to this goal, though
s fuel price concerns faded during the 1980s the work at Ames
ame to be justiﬁed more in terms of reducing congestion.
Erzberger’s speciality was trajectory algorithms; his earlier
ork on the Space Shuttle had focussed on idle thrust descentcial Science 6 (2015) 41–49
rajectories, which by their very nature are fuel-efﬁcient. According
o Erzberger, ‘we built these descent trajectories to be an idle thrust
escent all the way  to the bottom. . . . you’re ﬂying at thirty-ﬁve
housand and you know the route you’re going to ﬂy. Now imagine
ou have to pick a time, while you’re ﬂying, to land down there.
ou’re given the command, OK, close your throttles, never touch
hem again, but be assured that you’re going to get there without
urning the throttles back on again.’2
On its own  the minimum fuel trajectory descent initially proved
f little practical value for air trafﬁc management, especially with
he computational capability then available. As Erzberger later
ecalled: ‘The idea was just way ahead of its time. It was  basically
 bridge too far. Looking back, the whole work I did in the 1970s
as twenty years too early.’3 These trajectory calculations were
rigonometry based using a ‘kind of closed form solution’ to avoid
he need for ‘a lot of iteration and computationally intensive work.’4
his minimised the computational demands but meant that the tra-
ectories could not cope with the complexity of most real-world air
rafﬁc conditions. According to Erzberger: ‘We  soon found out that
ontrollers can’t work that because they have to interrupt the ﬂight
everal times because of other trafﬁc, the whole problem is so much
ore complicated than I really understood at the beginning. So this
as useless. The idea was still correct, just that the implementation
as complicated.’5
Although not practical for ATC when ﬁrst conceived, this work
n idle thrust descent algorithms found application in the 1980s
hrough its incorporation into aircraft Flight Management System
FMS) technology, which automates many in-ﬂight tasks, including
alculating the ﬂight plan. This meant that the FMS  could enable
n optimum fuel descent, although in practice this would rarely
e possible because ‘they get interrupted by the air trafﬁc control
rocess. So coming into a busy airport the FMS  doesn’t help them
ven though they have the capability on board to ﬂy very well from
op down to close to an idle descent.’6
When Erzberger returned to ATC in the mid-1980s he felt that
o make further progress he needed to test his algorithms with real,
ive air trafﬁc data – in contrast to the FAA’s then main contractor
or ATC research, the MITRE Corporation, that had never sought
ccess to live data. Getting access to this data for the work at NASA
mes was  not easy:
A huge struggle began around 1985, going to the FAA myself,
my managers, division chief, even the director of Ames, going
to meetings with the FAA to convince them to give us a data-link
to real-time air trafﬁc radar output. That was  a struggle that you
cannot believe.7
Erzberger argued that recorded data was  not adequate to under-
tand fully the challenges of ATC; with live data he could not
nly watch what air trafﬁc controllers were doing, but also phone
hem to get near real-time explanations for their actions. Amongst
hose convinced were two FAA Administrators, Admiral James B.
usey and General Thomas C. Richards who  visited Ames and found4 Erzberger 2008 Ferguson interview.
5 Erzberger 2010 interview.
6 Erzberger 2010 interview.
7 Erzberger 2008 Ferguson interview.
8 Erzberger 2008 Ferguson interview.
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p support from industry, lots of airline people, vice-presidents,
nited, American, and they were all totally enthused by it.’9
By the late 1980s the NASA team were able to put forward a
uite of tools to aid air trafﬁc controllers by providing accurate
redictions of arrival times, and calculating optimum ﬂight tra-
ectories. Earlier attempts at ATC automation had failed, it was
rgued, because of the ‘tendency of developers to underestimate
he complexity of automating even simple ATC functions’ [17, p.
]. Signiﬁcantly, the NASA system did not seek the full automation
hat had been the goal of earlier schemes. Rather the focus was
human-centred automation’ aimed at ‘developing tools that com-
lement the skills of controllers without restricting their freedom
o manage trafﬁc manually’ [17, p. 2].
The potential of this work stimulated sufﬁcient interest at the
AA for it to establish a joint programme with NASA [11, p. 1].
rzberger’s algorithms were meshed with databases ‘consisting
f several hundred aircraft performance models, airline preferred
perational procedures and a three-dimensional wind model’ to
nable trajectory projection [11, p. 1]. This meant it was possible to
ompute ‘aircraft trajectories approximately 40 min  into the future,
tarting at the aircraft’s current position, then factoring in the air-
raft’s intent as contained in its ﬂight plan, along with a model
f the performance capabilities of individual aircraft, including lift,
rag, and thrust, and atmospheric conditions’ [55, p. 30]. According
o Erzberger, ‘with new computer technologies and fast algorithms
 . . now we can do all of that stuff . . . to be able to get this fuel
ptimum trajectory and to avoid trafﬁc at the same time or make
nly very small deviations to avoid loss of separation against other
rafﬁc.’10
Previously this task has been handled through the ability of con-
rollers to visualise evolving aircraft movements so as to seek the
ptimum sequencing of aircraft, and to provide appropriate direc-
ions for changes in direction, altitude and speed. The task was
urther complicated by ‘the necessity to compensate for strong
ariations in ground speed during the descent as a result of altitude-
ependent winds and atmospheric effects’ [17, p. 5]. The NASA tools
ould assist controllers because they allowed the evolving situa-
ion to be predicted further into the future, enabling prediction up
o around 25 min  away rather than the 5–10 min  possible man-
ally [17, pp. 5 & 6]. The key tool was the Trafﬁc Management
dvisor (TMA) with its primary function ‘to plan the most efﬁ-
ient landing order and to assign optimally spaced landing times
o all arrivals’ [17, p. 3]. Working with aircraft at between 150
nd 200 miles from an airport, the TMA  plans arrival times ‘such
hat trafﬁc approaching from all directions will merge on the ﬁnal
pproach without conﬂicts and with optimal spacing’ [17, p. 3]. The
MA  software drives a screen that displays efﬁcient aircraft arrival
cheduling, enabling air trafﬁc controllers (should they choose) to
uickly advise pilots of necessary delays before they begin their
escents.
TMA  was introduced following protracted lobbying. Initially, the
AA was unconvinced by the need to adopt Erzberger’s approach,
ut the enthusiasm of the airlines proved crucial, as did the involve-
ent of key Congressional committees. According to Erzberger:
They [the airline companies] came and talked to me  and to others
ere and I demonstrated systems in the laboratory to them and then
hey put the pressure on the FAA to implement this and eventually
he FAA very much embraced the concept’.11 The airline companies
were the key advocate at that time; they went to the Congress and
sked the FAA to explain why this system should not be deployed.
9 Erzberger 2008 Ferguson interview.
10 Erzberger 2010 interview.
11 Erzberger 2010 interview.
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nd that gave a lot of incentive for the FAA to ask for monies and
hey provided the monies to do that.’12
The success of TMA  led to its widespread use, and it is now used
ot only for arrival trafﬁc, but has also been extended to handle
epartures from nearby airports:
For example, in the Los Angeles trafﬁc area you have this trafﬁc
from Vegas and from San Francisco and so TMA  is able to deter-
mine the best take off time slots for trafﬁc that is waiting to go
so that they don’t have to go and circle and overcrowd the air-
ports. So its made a huge difference over there . . . I was actually
stunned by it, the amount of time and fuel savings.13
NASA’s TMA  has improved US ATC efﬁciency in recent years,
iding air trafﬁc controllers, reducing congestion, and providing
uel savings. However, progress in ATC automation falls far short
f that predicted at the start of the 1980s. Further improvements
re underway in the FAA’s NextGen programme, including deploy-
ent of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B), a
echnology that can ‘update activity on air trafﬁc controller displays
ore frequently and with greater accuracy, providing information
uch as aircraft type, call sign, heading, altitude and speed’ [20, p.
1]. The introduction of ADS-B will thus beneﬁt ATC algorithms by
nabling more accurate trajectory predictions.
. Further US ATC modernisation
As a whole, though, NextGen plans are progressing slowly
37,28,61]. Some of the problems stem from the difﬁculty of
unding and coordinating improvements across a large, complex
ocio-technical system, with a key example being the ground-air
ata link system known as ‘Data Comm’, a relatively straightfor-
ard technology that could be implemented quickly if there were
ufﬁcient will on the part of key actors. Other signiﬁcant advances
epend on increased automation, where barriers to progress hinge
n fundamental concerns over safety (a key concern because of the
otential loss of life and bad publicity that could result from aircraft
ollisions).
Improvements in data links between ground controllers and
ircraft have long been considered desirable. In 1993 aviation com-
entator John Nance complained that: ‘Voice communications are
rchaic’ [41, p. 86]. For the purposes of ATC automation, voice
ommunications are inadequate to transmit detailed ﬂight plan
nformation. ATC automation technology can predict conﬂicts and
roduce revised ﬂight plans, but without a high bandwidth data
ink such as Data Comm, air trafﬁc controllers have to transmit
hese revisions verbally. Direct electronic transmission would both
liminate misunderstandings, and be more efﬁcient in not requir-
ng the aircrew to translate verbal instructions into a new ﬂight
lan: ‘The value of the data link is that you can send a complex
rajectory up directly into the aircraft FMS  or autopilot. That would
nvolve half a dozen numbers, such as coordinates of waypoints,
peeds, etc. There’s no way a controller could issue those precisely
y voice.’14
Air trafﬁc controllers could thus work much more efﬁciently,
hough they would still be in control. It would not be a fully auto-
ated system: ‘The controller and the pilots are still in the loop, but
here’s lots of numerical communications going on under the hood
hich humans need not know about, and then for the ﬁnal decision
12 Erzberger 2010 interview and email from Heinz Erzberger, November 30, 2011.
13 Erzberger 2010 interview and email from Heinz Erzberger, November 30, 2011.
14 Erzberger 2010 interview, and 2011 email.
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 controller can still be involved.’15 The automation would replace
outine activities, but not the air trafﬁc controllers themselves:
You would still have probably as many controllers as you have
today but they would be more handling exceptions. . . . The rou-
tine and repetitive stuff would be done by the automation in a
more precise way to ensure ﬂights are safely separated. And
then when there’s weather or emergency or the pilot asks for
deviations for a variety of reasons, the controller still has to
mediate that.16
In addition, a data link would enable aircraft data to be
ownloaded to the ground systems to help ﬁne-tune trajectory
redictions. Erzberger’s original algorithms provided a prediction
tandard deviation of around plus or minus 75 s, and although this
as improved, the error range needs to be brought down to plus or
inus 20 s in order to enable the most energy-efﬁcient continuous
escents.17 A data link to download aircraft data would enable this.
However, despite these advantages, data link implementation
as been delayed. As Perry [55, p. 32] noted over a decade ago:
While nearly everyone agrees data link is a good idea, implemen-
ation is not as obvious’. From NASA’s perspective, the problem is
hat ‘the value of this data link is not fully understood by both FAA
nd airlines.’18 With a wide range of actors involved, there is ‘a situ-
tion where the decisions are made by many different people with
otally different objectives . . . you have lots of players and they all
ave their own function to optimise which is not necessarily the
est for the optimisation of the system.’19
The data link technology currently in operation is the Aircraft
ommunications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) that
as introduced in the late 1970s to replace radio as the main means
hat airline companies could use to communicate with their air-
raft. A wide variety of data can be transmitted through ACARS
ncluding data on aircraft and engine performance, but although
CARS is used for air trafﬁc control, the limited data size precludes
he transmission of complex ﬂight plan changes.
ACARS had competitive beneﬁts to airline companies because it
rovided a mechanism for rapid reporting of their aircraft data, ‘but
hen it comes to data link for air trafﬁc control purposes, that’s not
 direct business case for them. They use their data links for com-
etitive advantages very directly, but data link used by air trafﬁc
ontrol doesn’t have the same parochial value to them.’20 Although
ore advanced ATC could offer beneﬁts in enabling fewer delays
nd fuel savings, it would do so equally to all airlines. Moreover,
ata Comm would not provide much beneﬁt to early adopters
ecause they would have to wait until adoption was widespread
efore its ATC use became standard. There is thus what has been
ermed a ‘NextGen Equipage Paradox’ in which ‘those operators
ho are last to equip with NextGen avionics gain the greatest
nancial beneﬁt, while those operators ﬁrst to adopt the new tech-
ologies will pay a much higher price at far greater risk’ ([31], p. 3;
ee also [9]).
While it appears that a suitable data link could be deployed rel-
tively easily were sufﬁcient funding and commitment available,
mplementing greater automation faces more fundamental obsta-
les. As well as enabling greater fuel-efﬁciency, the goal of such
n approach would be ‘to achieve a signiﬁcant increase in capacity
nd throughput while providing even higher levels of safety than
15 Erzberger 2010 interview, and 2011 email.
16 Erzberger 2010 interview, and 2011 email.
17 Interview with Heinz Erzberger, April 9, 2012.
18 Erzberger 2010 interview.
19 Interview with Banavar Sridhar, 8 November 2010.
20 Erzberger 2010 interview.
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oday’s system’ [18, p. 355]. The challenge, however, is making a
onvincing case that safety would not be compromised, never mind
mproved.
Automation could completely eliminate the current reliance
n air routes, facilitating fuel-efﬁcient ‘free ﬂight’ whilst ensuring
dequate separation, but there are two  safety concerns. First, the
ystem must be implemented in such a way  that the failure of any
ey component would not endanger aircraft. Thus Erzberger and
aielli [18, p. 357] argue that:
The most important technical and operational challenge . . . lies
in providing a safety net to ensure the safety of operations in the
event of failures of primary system components such as com-
puters, software, and data-link systems. This includes deﬁning
procedures for reverting to safe, though less efﬁcient, back-up
systems.
In addition, there is a second safety issue that appears more
undamental, and more difﬁcult to address, because it is centred
n concerns about the extent to which software can encompass all
ossible events, and to what degree safety can be demonstrated in
arge, complex programs. As Erzberger and Paielli [18, p. 361] note:
Automation software . . . is inherently limited to the solution
of problems that fall within the operational envelope deter-
mined by the ﬁnite parameterization of solutions built into
the software. Unfortunately, for complex software comprising
several hundred thousand lines of code, the controllable prob-
lem set cannot be determined, because of the extremely high
dimensionality of the input conditions that would have to be
evaluated. Therefore, the boundary between the set of solvable
and unsolvable problems is unknowable. Although the envelope
of problems that controllers can solve is also limited, it is much
larger . . . Moreover, human controllers excel at adapting their
control strategies to completely new situations, a capability that
is beyond existing software design.
The software of an automated system may  perform well under
xpected conditions, but ‘unplanned and unpredictable events,
uch as equipment failure or severe weather conditions, may  pro-
uce conditions that fall outside that envelope’ with the result that
trafﬁc ﬂow could become inefﬁcient and chaotic, risking the loss
f separation’ [18, p. 361].
Alongside this concern over the ability of the software to cope
ith unexpected conditions, there is general concern applicable
o large, complex software programs. Such software is difﬁcult to
erify because it cannot realistically (in terms of time and money)
e run in all possible states, and so it cannot be proven empiri-
ally. Although mathematical techniques can be used to carry out
formal veriﬁcation’ of software, providing deductive proof that
he software satisﬁes its speciﬁcation, such techniques are cur-
ently feasible only for software of modest size and complexity, and
rovide no defence against speciﬁcations that are inadequate or
rong [47]. In the case of advanced ATC automation, ‘the complex-
ty of the algorithms embedded in the software presents another
bstacle to the system passing a certiﬁcation test. Establishing the
obustness and operational envelope of the algorithms and even
ocumenting the design will be difﬁcult’ [18, pp. 361 & 362].
These challenges have led to uncertainty as to the degree
f automation that will be attempted in NextGen. In July
013, the Department of Transportation’s Inspector General
eported that the ‘FAA has not decided on the degree of
uman involvement in air trafﬁc management and separating
ircraft’ with the options ranging from ‘today’s largely manual
ight management to a mostly automated system centred on
achine-to-machine exchanges with little controller involvement’
61].
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. Lock-in and ATC
This condensed history of US ATC developments shows slow
rogress in modernisation. The long predicted automation has
ot happened, and even apparently modest technologies such as
ata Comm have not been implemented. Can this lack of progress
e explained as lock-in due to increasing returns and network
xternalities? Or do other factors limit progress in such complex
nfrastructure systems?
Network externalities clearly matter for initiatives such as Data
omm because there may  not be an immediate return on invest-
ent made by an individual airline until most other airlines have
lso made similar investments. A NASA interviewee noted that:
We  have to make a lot of infrastructure improvements and its not
lways possible to have beneﬁts immediately unless everybody has
dopted it. And that’s one of the biggest problems.’21 Similarly, even
hough ADS-B infrastructure is being deployed, users have been
ceptical about equipping their aircraft, ‘fearing early adopters will
ave to upgrade equipment one or more times before ADS-B is fully
perational’ [69, p. 38]. The highly networked nature of ATC inhibits
ncoordinated change, with the FAA having limited authority to
ompel such coordination.
In addition, there is also lock-in due to increasing returns
ecause of the learning effects that imbue conﬁdence in existing
echnology and practices, and militate against changes that might
ndermine safety. The essence of this lock-in lies not in any partic-
lar technological artefact or even network of artefacts (although
any are involved), but rather in judgments about what is suf-
ciently safe given the accumulated knowledge and expertise of
hose involved. The effectiveness of the ATC system, particularly
s regard safety, is widely regarded as hinging on ‘human fac-
ors’. Every change, and particularly every move towards increased
utomation, must thus be considered with regard to effects on
TC users and operators, who are central to handling any potential
vents because:
Humans are thought to be more ﬂexible, adaptable, and creative
than automation and thus better able to respond to changing or
unpredictable circumstances. Given that no automation tech-
nology (or its human designer) can foresee all possibilities in
a complex environment, the human operator’s experience and
judgment will be needed to cope with such conditions [71, pp.
241 & 242].
Objections to increased automation thus stem from concern
bout changing a system that works. The current ATC system (with
ontrollers managing aircraft along predeﬁned airways) is essen-
ially the same as established over ﬁfty years ago. Recent years have
een improvements such as the NASA-developed TMA system, but
ull automation would be a radical departure requiring ‘a change
n culture, and there’s always fear of the unknown.’22 In particu-
ar, the challenge of certifying safety for complex automated ATC
oftware is considered a fundamental barrier. Existing ATC tech-
ology is known to work safely, it is argued, whereas certiﬁcation
f fully automated ATC software is not possible, given the difﬁculty
f quantifying the risk involved.
However, the challenges to ATC modernisation go beyond over-
oming lock-in due to network externalities and increasing returns.
imely and radical change is also difﬁcult because of the broader
olitical and organisational factors that trouble many infrastruc-
ure projects. It has long been argued that ‘bounded rationality’
48] within organisations leads to routinised behaviour and a
endency to ‘satisﬁce’ that favours incremental over radical
21 Sridhar interview.
22 Erzberger 2010 interview.
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olutions, and others have noted what has been termed ‘institu-
ional lock-in’ [22,56] or entrapment [68] in which organisational
elationships limit rapid change. The US National Airspace System
s not just large and technically complex, it is also socially and
rganisationally complex, making change difﬁcult to achieve in ‘a
ituation where the decisions are made by many different people
ith totally different objectives.’23 A potential obstacle to further
utomation could be union concerns that this would involve job
osses. While NASA has stressed that automation is not a threat to
he jobs of air trafﬁc controllers, the European ‘Single European Sky’
utomation initiative has led to strikes centred on this concern.24
Moreover, the key US government actor in this process – the
AA – is limited in its ability to direct developments in areas other
han safety:
FAA has the overall control from the point of view of certifying
aircraft and providing the infrastructure for air trafﬁc man-
agement. That’s where their responsibility ends. . . . they can
ask airlines to put equipment in if it is necessary for safety, but
they don’t have any power to say, if everybody behaved this
way the system will run very efﬁciently. They have no way  of
enforcing that.25
In addition, there are speciﬁc political problems in the USA in an
ra of ﬁscal conservatism. The FAA’s funding must be voted through
ongress, and is prone to the political wrangling that typiﬁes the
nnual appropriations process. Funding for ATC modernisation has
hus only been approved ‘in dribs and drabs’ which ‘makes realis-
ic long-term planning for air trafﬁc control modernisation nearly
mpossible’ [57]. For example, in July 2011 the FAA instructed many
f its contractors, including some working on NextGen, to stop
ork due to the failure of Congress to pass a FAA bill [21].
. Policy implications: overcoming lock-in
This analysis indicates that overcoming ATC lock-in will be dif-
cult because of the many factors involved. Network externalities
nd increasing returns effects are exacerbated by the political and
rganisational limits to driving radical change in a large infrastruc-
ure project comprising a complex socio-technical system. Gil et al.
32, p. 453] conclude that infrastructure decisions involving many
artners tend to ‘freeze adoption decisions on proven technolo-
ies’ so as to reduce risk, and it is therefore important, as van der
ooren et al. [67, p. 115] recommend, that ‘policymakers should
llocate substantial ﬁnancial resources to the public support for
nfrastructure development’.
The risk-averse attitudes that favour proven technologies are a
articularly signiﬁcant barrier to ATC automation because of safety
oncerns that hinge on the perceived challenge of certifying the
eliability of complex software. However, as Downer [13–15] con-
incingly argues, current civil aviation technology (his work deals
ith aircraft and not ATC) is certiﬁed even though its reliability can-
ot be readily quantiﬁed. The FAA’s approach to safety certiﬁcation
equires that aviation technologies and procedures should meet
peciﬁed performance requirements, but this relies on judgement
ather than objective measurement alone.Measuring the performance of new technologies depends on
esting, but this can differ from operational use in signiﬁcant ways.
ero-engines, for example, cannot be tested to destruction in large
23 Sridhar interview.
24 http://www.airport-technology.com/features/featuremaurizio-castelletti-of-
he-european-commission-discusses-the-single-european-sky-2-4214375/
accessed 15.08.14].
25 Sridhar interview.
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umbers because of the expense of so doing. The data that is col-
ected from engine tests with regard to their ability to withstand
ird strikes is therefore necessarily limited, and contingent on the
articular way that the tests are designed and carried out [13].
here is thus an unavoidable element of judgement involved in
ircraft certiﬁcation [27], but all involved – regulators, manufac-
urers and airline companies – have a strong, shared interest in a
onservative approach that prioritises high safety standards.
Downer’s work points to how ATC lock-in due to increasing
eturns can be overcome. Complex automation software can never
e fully tested, of course, but it can be tested extensively without
afety risks because it can be run in parallel with current ATC oper-
tions. Thanks to Erzberger’s initiative in the 1980s, NASA Ames
as such a capability:
On the other side of this hallway is our laboratory and we have
the live data, live radar data coming in from all the centres and
some TRACON’s as well. We  can drive our system with this and
see what the decisions are and watch it. Of course they have
their system in operation for real but we can monitor that, we
can shadow that. And when we have better algorithms, we
can see the difference, we can check out new software and
systems.26
This means that the developers of new ATC software have the
bility to carry out real-time simulation, to use live trafﬁc data,
nd to interact with air trafﬁc controllers and pilots in this process.
his facilitates a highly iterative development process in which
the requirements, design, simulation, and operational tests are
onducted concurrently with a high level of interaction’ and new
evelopments can be introduced gradually with an approach of
design a little, test a little’ [11, p. 1].
Thus, although in principle the risks involved with ATC software
annot be quantiﬁed, in practice this software can be tested exten-
ively. As one of the computing’s pioneering ﬁgures, J.C.R. Licklider,
ut it in 1969, ‘even quite complex software subsystems can be
mastered” (which is not the same as “perfected”) and made to
rovide useful and effective service if they can be developed pro-
ressively, with the aid of extensive testing of systems (as well as
ubsystems and components), and if they can be operated more or
ess continually in a somewhat lenient and forgiving environment’
45, pp. 126 & 127]. ATC software meets Licklider’s requirements in
his regard. By shadowing live air trafﬁc operations, new ATM soft-
are can be operated before being introduced into use. And when
ntroduced, more than one software system can be used to provide
edundancy for separation assurance [19].
Finally, it should be noted that although the potential fuel sav-
ngs with more efﬁcient ATC for any particular ﬂight may  be of the
rder of 5–10%, overall environmental beneﬁts cannot be guaran-
eed to accrue due to the ‘Jevons paradox’. Lower fuel costs could
ean cheaper ﬂights, thus increasing demand and leaving total cli-
ate change emissions no lower (see [54]). While better ATC can
ave other beneﬁts for climate change because of the potential to
educe cloud formation by rerouting aircraft, gaining the full ben-
ﬁts of fuel efﬁciency may  require other policy measures to limit
ustomer demand.
. Conclusions
This case study of US ATC goes beyond most previous studies
f lock-in by providing a detailed account of the mechanisms
hat inhibit change. This analysis shows that the barriers to US
TC modernisation feature the classic lock-in characteristics of
26 Erzberger 2010 interview, and 2011 email.
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ncreasing returns and network externalities. In particular, the
entrality of safety to the functionality of ATC means that new
pproaches – notably automation – are judged against the learning
ffects of increasing returns perceived to have accrued in the
raditional manual approach to aircraft control. Overcoming this
ype of lock-in requires particular attention to building trust in
utomation (through the provision of redundancy, piecemeal
ntroduction in semi-automated operation, and laboratory testing
f a shadow system).
This analysis suggests that classic lock-in theory has two  limita-
ions, at least for this type of technology. First, whereas traditional
ock-in theory posits economic obstacles to change, this analysis
f ATC lock-in suggests that barriers to change can involve per-
eptions of risk that do not comprise readily calculable costs or
eneﬁts. Instead, the more sociological analysis done here indicates
hat apparently quantiﬁable entities such as reliability are not only
onstructed by the actors, but also ﬁltered through organisational
enses. Just as trust in aircraft performance depends crucially on
he relationship of the FAA to aviation engineers rather than on
stimates of reliability [14], so too trust in ATC performance can-
ot be generated solely through calculation. Similar concerns are
ikely to arise in other software-intensive technologies where risk
inimisation is central (for example, in nuclear power operation).
Second, over-emphasis on lock-in as an explanation can mean
hat more mundane, but equally important, factors are ignored.
n the case of infrastructure, large amounts of investment need to
e obtained and coordinated. ATC technology may be an extreme
xample, but many infrastructure projects face the challenge of
riving change across a complex network of heterogeneous organi-
ations and interests. In the case of ATC, achieving further advances
n automation will require more than just good technology, it will
lso require ‘heterogeneous engineering’ [44], combining techni-
al developments with efforts to overcome signiﬁcant political and
rganisational barriers (just as Erzberger and his NASA colleagues
ad to do to lobby an initially reluctant FAA to adopt the TMA  tool).
Understanding and promoting environmental transitions is one
f the most important challenges we face [1]. In recent years the
onceptual orthodoxy requires that such transitions be under-
tood in terms of the Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) approach (e.g.
34,29]). In contrast, the other side of the coin, so to speak, has
een neglected, with relatively few recent studies of the lock-in
f existing sociotechnical systems. However, understanding why
ransitions do not occur is important to provide some method-
logical ‘symmetry’ to MLP  case studies that overwhelmingly
escribe successful transitions. As leading MLP  proponents [30, p.
9] acknowledge, there is a need to ‘correct the bias towards win-
ers and novelty’ in our understanding of transitions. In some cases
e.g. [12]) ‘de-alignment’ of existing regimes appears to happen
elatively easily, whereas in others the ‘path dependence’ effects of
ock-in are stronger. Detailed historical case studies [35] can help us
nderstand why  some regimes are more locked-in and others more
asily de-aligned. The implications of this study of ATC are that
ock-in effects can constitute a signiﬁcant hurdle to even modest
ransitions, and that detailed study of speciﬁc cases are important
ecause targeted rather than generic solutions may be needed.
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